Stakeholders’ perceptions on earnings management motivations and techniques in Libyan commercial banks by Barghathi, Yasser
1 
 
Stakeholders’ perceptions on Earnings management motivations and techniques in Libyan 
Commercial Banks  
1. Introduction 
Literature on earnings management attributes the existence of such a practice due to conflict of 
interest between owners and managers (Wu et al., 2016). This managerial behaviour, according to 
Aerts et al. (2013) is mainly incurred for “the benefit of insiders” by acting as to “mislead 
outsiders’ perceptions” about the firm’s financial performance (p. 94). Incentives represent the 
rational basis for earnings management practice; without those incentives, managers should not be 
deterred from choosing accounting judgments and methods that fairly represent the economic 
performance of the firm. In many cases, managers may find themselves in situations in which they 
are tempted to manipulate the reported profits because the firm’s value and mangers’ wealth are 
associated with the reported earnings (Jackson and Pitman, 2001). Despite the fact that earnings 
management is widespread (Levitt, 1998), it is difficult for researchers to document it with credible 
proof as verifying whether earnings have been managed is not an easy task. Identifying the 
manger’s incentives to manage earnings and estimating whether patterns of otherwise unexpected 
accruals are consistent with these incentives could help (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
Financial reporting quality research on developed countries has extensively been reported by 
literature. However, very little attention was given to emerging markets including like Libya where 
there are calls for more research to investigate this issue (Zakari and Menacere, 2012; Sawan and 
Alsaqqa, 2013; Sawan and Alzeban, 2015; Barghathi etl al, 2017). 
This paper explores the Libyan Commercial Banks’s stakeholders’ perceptions in relation to the 
motivations and managerial incentives that induce bank managers to involve in earnings 
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management. The stakeholders’ perceptions regarding earnings management techniques i.e. how 
earnings are manged by LCBs’ manager are also investigated.  
Our study contributes to the literature in two respects. Primarily, it is perhaps the first study in 
Libya to examine the EM motivations and techniques. Previous studies particularly on Libya have 
focused only on the existence of EM (Elseraiti, 2011; Barghathi et al., 2017). The present paper 
fills the research gap by examining why LCBs’ managers are engaged in EM and how earnings 
can be managed. Second, we also add to the earnings management literature in general and in 
Libya in particular by eextending the prior work of Barghathi et al. (2017) who confirmed the 
existence of EM. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2, provide background on literature 
review on earnings management motivation and techniques. Also, the section develops the main 
research questions. Section 3 presents the research methodology. Section 4 reports the research 
results while section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review 
Bank managers are much more concerned about earnings stability and growth; therefore it is 
anticipated that bank managers are engaged in earnings management (Bhat, 1996). Banks 
generally represent a significant proportion of total listed companies which means that banks have 
an influential role in the capital market (Kanagaretnam et al. 2010). Shen and Chih (2005) stressed 
the importance of banks and describe the banks’ share in the capital market as “typically large”. 
Moreover, banks play a vital role in economic development, with investors and regulators 
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monitoring banks’ performance on a regular basis; the former for monitoring share prices, the latter 
to assure the robustness of a banking system’s financial soundness. As a result, reported earnings 
growth remains one of the key pointers that demonstrate a bank’s performance and financial 
stability which ultimately suggests that bank managers may be inclined to smooth earnings 
volatility over periods. By earnings management in general and income smoothing in particular, 
bank managers can help to sustain the appearance of a robust financial position as well as meeting 
legal requirements (Taktak et al., 2010a). It has been suggested that income smoothing is a 
continuing practice that is employed by banks (Bhat, 1996). Moreover bank managers are accused 
of being more likely to indulge in earnings manipulations compared to others (Leventis, 2011). 
For instance, Bhat (1996) suggests that banks’ managers exercise income smoothing for a number 
of reasons: (a) to enhance the risk perceptions of the bank to its investors and regulators; (b) to 
support managers’ efforts in maintaining their compensation schemes; (c) to satisfy shareholders 
where income smoothing will enable managers to afford a constant stream of dividends; and (d) 
to provide low quality managers with a good chance of delivering an image of high quality 
management to investors where measuring management’s quality is difficult.  Also, banks’ 
managers may smooth earnings to reduce tax payments and improve share prices. 
An overview of the literature related to earning management motivation and earnings management 
techniques are reported in the following two section.  
2.1 Managerial Incentives for Earnings Management 
Four kinds of incentives have been identified as inducing managers to be involved in earnings 
management: external contract incentives; management compensation contract incentives; 
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regulatory and political motivations; and capital market motivations (Noronha et al., 2008). These 
motivations are briefly discussed in the following section. 
External Contract Incentives 
Some external contracts, for example debt contracts, dividend covenants and supplying contracts 
contain provisions by which a company agrees to reach a certain level of earnings, debt, or limit 
payments to the shareholders (Noronha et al., 2008). When the company is close to violating one 
of the covenants, managers may be motivated to misrepresent the accounting data and therefore 
the reported earnings so they can meet the contract requirements and avoid default by increasing 
the reported income (Noronha et al. 2008; Duncan, 2001; Jackson and Pitman, 2001). Some 
lending contracts are based on accounting numbers and designed in a way to restrict certain types 
of managers’ decisions e.g. “value-reducing investment and financing decisions” which, according 
to Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 210), provide incentives to managers for accounts 
manipulation. They hypothesized that managers are expected to manipulate earnings when a 
“firm’s debt/equity ratio” (p. 216) becomes relatively large. The literature reports other evidence 
that firms which are close to lending covenant limits are engaged in earnings management, for 
example Defond and Jiambalvo (1994 cited in Noronha et al., 2008) in their study found that firms 
did accelerate earnings in the year prior to a covenant violation. Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) 
found out that UK listed firms which are close to debt covenant violations employ earnings 
management practices in order to not default the covenants. 
Management Compensation Contract Incentives 
Accounting figures represent the basis to control and regulate contractual relationships among a 
company’s stakeholders; management compensation is such a relationship (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). Companies may link the bonus programmes of managers with their economic performance 
in order to bring into line management’s’ goals with those of shareholders which in return provides 
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a very strong incentive for managers to employ the reported earnings to increase their 
compensation payments (Duncan, 2001). Healy (1985) blamed management compensation for 
creating incentives that induce managers to engage in earnings management. Management 
compensation which is regarded as the “primary incentive for earnings management” (Achilles et 
al., 2013, p. 581) is basically placed to combine both managers’ and shareholders’ interests as 
these two groups’ interests can be conflicted (Wolk et al., 2008). However, according to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986), managers of firms with earnings-based bonuses are expected to manipulate 
the reported earnings to their own advantage. In the UK, listed firm managers, according to Iatridis 
and Kadorinis (2009), are improving their financial numbers through earnings management 
practices so that their compensation is protected or increased.  
Mangers may also attempt to manipulate reported income out of concern for job security. When 
current earnings are low while next year’s profit is expected to be relatively high, mangers may 
advance some earnings from the next period to the present and in contrast when the current year’s 
profit is high and next year’s earnings are expected to be low, mangers may also shift some 
earnings to the next year. Moreover, managers typically believe that reporting a growing steady 
stream of income is highly appreciated by financial analysts (Jackson and Pitman, 2001). In 
addition, individuals may be motivated to get a promotion based on the fact that people may be 
very obsessed with climbing the corporate ladder; this aspect along with a company policy to 
reward ambitious persons, means that seeking or gaining a promotion can be an incentive to 
manipulate earnings (Duncan, 2001). 
Regulatory and Political Motivations  
Regulatory incentives to manage earnings may be very significant in cases where reported earnings 
will affect the procedures of regulatory or government officials. Commercial banks in Libya, for 
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example, are monitored by the Central Bank of Libya for compliance with regulation and in such 
a case, managers may be motivated to manipulate the reported earnings in order to avoid the 
actions that could be taken by such a governmental and regulatory body (Jackson and Pitman, 
2001). Moreover, some banking regulations require banks to maintain a certain minimum level of 
capital adequacy requirements that are represented in the form of accounting figures. Such 
regulations may tempt managers to manipulate these figures to meet the requirements (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999).  
In addition, tough taxation laws may induce firms to manipulate their reported income. According 
to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), managers are motivated to manipulate the reported earnings to 
avoid political costs, they hypothesised that managers are more likely to manage the reported 
earnings downwards to lessen the tax expenses. Baralexis (2004) found out that small firms in 
Greece employ earnings management to gain tax savings. Likewise, Gonchanalyze and 
Zimmermann (2006) tested the earnings management practices of Russian companies in the years 
2001 and 2002 to find out that Russian companies lessen their reported income in order to reduce 
income taxes. 
Capital Market Motivations 
Meeting revenue expectations and analysts’ predictions may be the main catalysts that induce 
managers to manipulate earnings (Magrath and Weld, 2002). The capital market incentive stems 
basically from the connection between reported earnings and a company’s market value, due to 
the fact that stock markets typically respond negatively to companies that fail to meet analysts’ 
earnings expectations. Companies which are not reaching these predictions may be involved in 
earnings management to satisfy analysts’ expectations (Jackson and Pitman, 2001). Eventually, 
failing to meet analysts’ expectations can lead to adverse consequences on a company’s stock price 
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e.g. when Procter & Gamble declared that the company would not reach  the analysts’ forecast in 
the first quarter of 2000, its stock price decreased by 30% (Duncan, 2001). Literature suggests that 
managers are concerned about meeting or beating the analysts’ expectations and that it is a 
“fundamental” target since stock market severely reacts to negative reported earnings (relative to 
expectations), moreover, the positive earnings (relative to expectations) are rewarded which, 
according to Athanasakou et al. (2009) gives managers a strong incentive to manipulate the 
reported earnings.  
Glaum et al. (2004), for example, compared the earnings management incentives of US and 
German firms; they found that both U.S. and German firms are managing their earnings to avoid 
losses and decreases in earnings. Evidence was reported by Athanasakou et al. (2009) who 
examined UK firms’ engagement in earnings management for the purpose of meeting analyst 
earnings expectations. Their findings suggest that UK firms tend to manipulate their income to 
meet the analysts’ expectation and to avoid reporting negative earnings. Kamel and Elbanna (2010) 
examined the potential incentives for engagement in earnings management in Egypt to find out 
that Egyptian firms are mainly engaged in earnings management for the purpose of, among others, 
reporting profits and avoiding reporting losses as well as achieving high-share valuation. 
2.2 Earnings Management in the Banking Industry 
The literature reports that banks’ managers use the LLP as a mechanism for earnings manipulation 
(Anandarajan et al. 2003, 2007; Kanagaretnam, 2010; Leventis et al. 2011; DeBoskey and Jiang, 
2012). GAAP offers latitude in choices available to account for a specific set of financial events 
which gives the opportunity to smooth income through choosing from accounting alternatives. 
Given the considerable scope for banks’ managers when estimating the amount of LLP, banks’ 
managers may smooth earnings by manipulating LLP (Bhat, 1996; Kanagaretnam et al., 2003). 
8 
 
LLPs are designed to reflect the sum of funds that are likely to be lost in the future (Bhat, 1996). 
LLPs reveal the expected future loan losses to be disclosed in the current period as accrued 
expenses on the income statement (Whalen, 1994). However, “federal banks and securities 
regulators” realize that the LLPs that have been anticipated by bank managers cannot precisely 
match real losses and thus include a margin for inaccuracy, a margin that has been exploited by 
bank managers (Anandarajan et al. 2007). According to Whalen (1994), bank managers possess 
private information about the default risk inherent in LLPs and as a result their judgement in 
estimating LLPs each period is essential. He added that investors and regulators cannot obtain all 
of bank managers’ information as it is “prohibitively costly” and accordingly “bank managers can 
exercise discretion over the timing of provisions for certain loan losses”. 
Shen and Chih (2005) list three factors that demonstrate the importance of studying earnings 
management in the banking industry. First, banks at all times fear a potential problem of illiquidity 
that puts them under the risk of extensive bank runs. Therefore, with the intention of retaining 
depositors’ confidence, banks resort to earnings management practices in order to avoid negative 
earnings. 
Second, they cite Morgan (2002) who says that: “… uncertainty over the banks stems from their 
assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to 
change. Banks’ high leverage compounds the uncertainty over their assets; their assets present 
bankers with ample opportunities’ for risk or asset substitution, and their high leverage inclines 
them to do so.” Therefore, bank managers have a high incentive to manage earnings to hide asset 
substitution behaviour.  
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Third, banks are highly regulated organizations in which a non-performing loan ratio, among other 
things (i.e. capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, etc.) is firmly regulated. Therefore, earnings 
management could be adopted in order to avoid regulations’ breach. 
According to Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) a bank’s LLP is the proper approach to study earnings 
management in the banking sector for two reasons. First, given the considerable discretion that is 
allowed by GAAP, bank managers may use this flexibility in using LLP for earnings management. 
Second, LLPs are considered to be major accrual items in banks accounts that provide bank 
managers with sufficient leeway in manipulating earnings. 
The literature shows a great deal of research on earnings management practices. However, only 
little is related to the banking industry (Taktak et al. 2010b). According to Peasnell et al. (2000, p. 
318), financial institutions may be excluded due to the difference in the financial reporting system 
between financial firms and industrial firms. Also, financial firms have a “fundamentally different 
accrual process” relative to other industries. 
According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, cited in Shen and Chih, 2005) conflicting incentives 
may exist within regulated firms in general to report lower earnings or decreases in earnings 
whenever economic benefits from reporting lower earnings to regulators take place. More 
particularly, in the financial institutions category which includes the banking industry, there may 
be a negative relationship between avoiding earnings decreases and the extent of regulatory 
oversight. Much research on financial institutions is carried out in the USA and Europe and has 
come to a conclusion that LLPs are widely used for, amongst other things, earnings management 
(Anandarajan et al. 2003, 2007; Leventis et al., 2011). 
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Researchers have adopted different techniques to test for bank managers’ use of LLPs to manage 
earnings. Some used the specific accrual technique; others have applied the earnings distribution 
techniques. The next section provides a summary of some studies that examined earnings 
management or specifically income smoothing as a form of earnings management within the 
banking industry. It is notable that none of these studies followed the first quantitative technique 
(total accruals). 
Bhat (1996) examined the income smoothing hypothesis for 148 banks that reported their earnings 
over the period 1981-1991. To examine whether banks smooth their income the researcher 
regressed logarithms of earnings after taxes and LLP against the year. His results suggest that 
banks use LLP to manipulate reported earnings. 
Another study that followed the specific accrual technique was conducted by Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2003) who studied the underlying motives of bank managers for income smoothing through LLPs. 
They provided evidence that bank managers use LLPs for income smoothing as they save earnings 
through LLPs in good times to borrow them in bad times. Their results suggest that job security 
and the cost of borrowing motivate bank managers to engage in income smoothing practices; 
managers faced with job security fears typically use LLPs as an income smoothing device. They 
claim their findings to be of great interest to regulatory bodies who are interested in banks’ 
financial reporting quality. 
Anandarajen et al. (2003; 2007) also followed the same technique to capture earnings management 
behaviour. For instance, Anandarajen et al. (2007) examine the use of LLPs by Australian banks 
for earnings management. The data used was from the financial reports of 50 commercial banks, 
10 of which are listed banks, for the period of 1991-2001; the total number of observations was 
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441. Their results show that Australian banks in general use LLPs to manage earnings, and, listed 
banks are more likely to do so relative to unlisted ones. Their results also suggest that regulators 
consider the fact that managed reported earnings do not precisely represent the real economic 
performance when assessing the “overall financial risk”. 
Agarwal et al. (2007) investigate earnings management practices within Japanese banks and found 
out that Japanese banks do significantly use LLPs to manage earnings in the period of 1985-1996. 
Other evidence from Japan is provided by Kwak et al. (2009) who investigated the use of LLPs by 
Japanese bank managers for the period of 1996-1999 and found out that Japanese bank managers 
manipulate LLPs to signal financial strength when they need external financing. Both studies 
employed the specific accrual technique to detect earnings management within Japanese banks. 
Taktak et al. (2010a) studied the practice of income smoothing on a sample of 278 commercial 
banks operating in OECD countries. They offered evidence of artificial and real income smoothing 
as their results indicate that the majority of the banks do smooth their incomes intentionally by 
LLPs or by selling trading securities. Their results also indicated that income smoothing is 
influenced by both banking regulatory and institutional factors.  
The specific accrual technique has been also applied to Islamic banks. On a sample of 66 Islamic 
banks from various Muslim countries, Taktak et al. (2010b) found that Islamic banks extensively 
smooth their incomes. However, their study provided no evidence on the use of LLPs to smooth 
income by Islamic banks. They examined whether Islamic banks do smooth their income using 
LLPs. However, they studied only one form of income smoothing that is, artificial income 
smoothing through LLPs resulting from Islamic financial products i.e murabaha, musharaka and 
mudaraba. 
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Other studies, for example, Shen and Chih (2005) adopted the third quantitative technique that is, 
earning distribution discontinuities. In their study as to whether earnings management within the 
banking industry is practiced across 48 countries they found that earnings management certainly 
was practiced in their sample. They used three measures to test for earnings management based on 
those of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Leuzet al. (2003). They tested whether banks manage 
their earnings so as to surpass thresholds, such zero earnings and zero earnings changes. 
Leventis et al. (2011) examined the impact of IFRS implementation on the use of LLPs to manage 
earnings within 91 EU listed commercial banks operating in 18 European countries. They divided 
their sample into two categories; early adopters and later adopters. Their results reveal that banks 
do manage their earnings through LLPs but the implementation of IFRS has meaningfully reduced 
earnings management behaviour. 
The earnings management in Islamic banks has been also confirmed by using the earnings 
distribution approach. Hamdi and Zarai (2012) revealed, that although earnings management 
practices are not as obvious in Islamic banks compared non-Islamic bank; Islamic banks are 
engaged in earnings management practices mainly to avoid reporting losses and earnings 
decreases. Their sample consisted of 125 Islamic banks which offered 1244 bank-year 
observations. The data related to 27 countries and covered the fiscal years 2000 to 2009. 
3. Research methodology 
This papers aims to investigate the perceptions of different stakeholders about the earnings 
management motivations and techniques in the LCBs. The empirical work of the current paper 
draws on findings concluded by Barghathi et al. (2017), as a result the questionnaire was designed 
in order to examine the motivations and techniques of earnings management in LCBs. It locates 
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itself in the interpretive paradigm. In the interpretive paradigm, the researcher elicits the 
individuals’ perceptions toward an issue as is done in this study. The results of this study will be 
discussed from the accountability perspective; in other words the conceptual framework of this 
study is accountability. In addition to the above aims; this study is focusing on the accountability 
relationships of banks managers with; shareholders and other stakeholders. By other words, this 
study tries to examine whether evident accountability relationships are taking place in the context 
of financial reporting of the Libyan Commercial Banks. Earnings management may have an 
adverse consequence on accountability relationships. Accountability, or being accountable, relies 
on managers providing useful, unbiased, and reliable information to the firm’s stakeholders. Aers 
et al. (2013) stated that earnings management could reveal an accountability breach, they indicated: 
“Given users’ ex ante uncertainty with regard to management’s earnings 
management motives, indication of earnings management may be perceived as a 
significant accountability predicament, and bring management to offer more 
explanations on performance-related matters in ” (p. 95).  
A questionnaire should be pre-tested to ensure that all questions and instructions are clear to 
participants, it is also good practice to test the time it takes a participant to complete it. The first 
pilot study was undertaken in December 2012 in the School of Business at the University of 
Dundee on three PhD students who were undertaking their doctoral studies in different accounting 
topics. Their comments and ideas were important and resulted in some helpful suggestions. The 
second pilot study was undertaken in Libya with three auditors, one of whom holds an MSc in 
accounting from a US university and two academics, one of whom holds a PhD from an Egyptian 
university, to ensure an accurate translation and understandability of the questionnaire. The 
feedback was useful in terms of the Arabic translation and questions were modified based on the 
suggestions of two of the auditors. 
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Thus self-administration was selected, the distribution process took place in the period early 
January 2013 till February 2013 during which time 193 copies were given to various stakeholders 
of the Libyan Commercial Banks. The researcher had the benefit of a helpful network that had 
been developed over the previous years from the audit profession; a number of potential 
respondents were personally known to the researcher, or are currently, or were, clients for either 
audit or non-audit services of the office where the researcher works1. In addition, some of 
respondents offered to help to distribute more copies of the questionnaire to their own colleagues 
who worked in the same place and also to contacts in other banks. The procedure with other 
stakeholders was largely the same. Regulators from the Central Bank of Libya, for example, were 
accessed through a family member who works for the bank in a non-accounting position, as well 
as through the manager of the Benghazi branch of the central bank of Libya who is known to the 
researcher and who was of great assistance when asked to contact more employees to encourage 
their participation in the survey. Personal contacts were also useful in getting co-operation from 
the tax authority, the Libyan Stock Market, external auditors, academics and other stakeholders. 
 
In total 193 questionnaires were distributed and collected personally. Questionnaires were attached 
to a covering letter stating the purpose of the study and encouraging the participants to take part in 
it; it also identified the researcher and assured the anonymity and confidentiality of any 
information which respondents would provide.  
One of the most common ways to examine the scale of reliability of a questionnaire is Cronbach’s. 
This test, according to Saunders et al. (2012), is used to measure the response consistency among 
                                                 
1 Efforts were given to ensure that those who were identified as respondents were involved in the financial reporting 
process e.g. accountant, internal auditor or holding a management position. 
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the questions; its values range between 0 and 1.0 where a scale of 0.7 or above is considered as 
acceptable. The Cronbach’s alpha for this study has been calculated by SPSS and the generated 
score was 0.922 which is, according to the above recommendations, acceptable.  
 
As shown in Table 1 the response rate of this questionnaire was 53%. It varied, amongst the groups 
of respondents, from 48% for Preparers to 64% for Regulators. 
Table 1: The Returned Questionnaires 
Respondent Groups Distributed Questionnaires 
Returned 
Questionnaires Response Rate 
Preparers 56 27 48% 
Auditors  54 27 50% 
Regulators 31 20 64% 
Users  52 28 54% 
Total 193 102 53% 
Note: this Table shows the numbers of distributed and returned questionnaires, as well as the response rate according 
to each group. More details about the personal information of the respondents are presented in Table 7.2. 
 
The total proportions of each individual group (Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and Users) are 
26.5%, 26.5%, 19.6%, and 27.5% respectively; most are male (90 out of 102 or 88.2%). Twenty 
eight (27.5%) are professionally qualified, mainly being members of the Libyan Accountants and 
Auditors Association (LAAA) (24 or 23.5%). Ninety (88.2%) of the respondents have an academic 
qualification higher than a Diploma which suggests a good basic knowledge of financial issues. 
Most importantly, 78 (76.5%) of the respondents have indicated that they have banking experience 
which again gives a reasonable level of assurance as regards to obtaining informed  views about 
Libyan commercial banks  (LCBs). 
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Table 2: Respondents’ Personal Information 
Statement Category 
Groups 
Preparers Auditors Regulators Users 
 %  %  %  % 
Age 
Less than 25 1 3.7       
26-30 3 11.1   2 10.0 11 39.3 
31-40 15 55.6 5 18.5 8 40.0 10 35.7 
41-50 4 14.8 11 40.7 9 45.0 7 25.0 
Over 50 4 14.8 11 40.7 1 5.0   
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Gender 
Male 26 96.3 25 92.6 20 100 19 67.9 
Female 1 3.7 2 7.4   9 32.1 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Professional 
Qualification 
LAAA 6 22.2 12 44.4 1 5.0 5 17.9 
ACCA 3 11.1       
AICPA   1 3.7     
ICAEW         
CIMA         
Others 1        
Total 10 37.0 13 48.1 1 5.0 5 17.9 
Education 
PhD   6 22.2   3 10.7 
Master 2 7.4   4 20.0 7 25.0 
Bachelor 20 74.1 19 70.4 14 70.0 15 53.6 
Diploma 3 11.1 1 3.7 1 5.0 3 10.7 
Other  1 3.7 1 3.7 1 5.0   
Total 26 96.3 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Location of 
highest 
qualification 
Libya 23 85.2 20 74.1 19 95.0 25 89.3 
Other Arab country 1 3.7 5 18.5   2 7.1 
UK 2 7.4 1 3.7 1 5.0 1 3.6 
USA 1 3.7 1 3.7     
Other          
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Place of Work 
Commercial Bank 27        
Central Bank of Libya     14 65.0   
Libyan Stock Market     3 20.0   
Tax Authority     3 15.0   
Audit firm   19 70.3     
State Audit   8 29.6     
Academic       15 53.6 
Others       13 46.4 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Banking 
Experience 
Less 5 years 9 33.3 15 55.6 3 15.0 24 85.7 
5-10 8 29.6 2 7.4 7 35.0 1 3.6 
11-15 3 11.1 2 7.4 4 20.0 2 7.1 
Over 15 7 25.9 8 29.6 6 30.0 1 3.6 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Note: LAAA = Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association, ACCA = Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, AICPA = American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, ICAEW = Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, and CIMA = Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. 
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4. Research results 
4.1 Stakeholders’ Perceptions about Earnings Management Motivations 
This section investigates respondents’ opinions about the motivations that induce bank managers 
to indulge in earnings management practices. Several questions have been listed in this section; 
these were mainly based on the literature. The questions were split into two groups (state and 
private) in order to examine whether ownership has any influence over perceived earnings 
management motivations in the LCBs; they also examined the influence of the Libyan Stock 
Market’s effect on earnings management practices by asking if it was thought to affect the bank’s 
share price.  The results are shown in Table 3 (Panel A) and reveal a relatively strong level of 
agreement overall among stakeholder groups for all the questions. This suggests that the listing 
requirements were perceived to influence bank managers to engage in earnings management 
practices no matter the type of ownership as state and private banks were seen to be similarly 
motivated on this issue. More specifically, the Auditors group recorded a slight difference for 
question (Q 1.6) which investigated whether there was any institutional effect on bank managers 
that encouraged involvement in earnings management practices. They perceived that State owned 
banks, on average, were not motivated by other banks behaviour (mean score 2.92), and that 
private banks were, on balance, neutral on this motive; their mean score was 3.00. This result 
should be considered in light of the fact that most of the Auditors who responded (14 out of 27) 
have no professional qualification (see Table 2) which therefore, may explain this unexpected 
response. The questionnaire responses by Auditors only (Appendix xx) reveals that Auditors 
agreed and disagreed with this statement almost equally; as 7 agreed whereas another 7 disagreed 
and only one Auditor strongly disagreed with this statement. It seems that this Auditor, in addition, 
to a relatively large amount (11) who gave a neutral responses to this statement, is responsible for 
the below mid-point mean score (2.92) that was generated by the Auditors group. 
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As can be noted in Table 3 (Panel A), the KW test reveals no significant differences.  
Table 3: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about Earnings Management Motivations 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD Group Means K-W P-value PR AD RG US 
1.1.1 Management compensation – state 91 3.37 1.071 3.43 3.26 3.24 3.54 .610 
1.1.2 Management compensation – private 92 3.73 .939 3.74 3.88 3.50 3.73 .606 
1.2.1 Job security – state 89 3.43 1.010 3.38 3.33 3.44 3.56 .774 
1.2.2 Job security – private 92 3.62 .936 3.74 3.72 3.53 3.48 .756 
1.3.1 To avoid regulatory intervention – state 91 3.42 1.065 3.45 3.37 3.00 3.68 .198 
1.3.2 To avoid regulatory intervention – 
private 91 3.51 .935 3.52 3.44 3.47 3.58 .950 
1.4.1 The desire to report smooth earnings – 
state 92 3.40 .973 3.40 3.19 3.53 3.54 .305 
1.4.2 The desire to report smooth earning – 
private 91 3.52 .886 3.74 3.32 3.44 3.56 .359 
1.5.1 To influence other stakeholders - state 91 3.16 1.036 3.21 3.04 3.12 3.29 .864 
1.5.2 To influence other stakeholders – 
private 91 3.43 1.034 3.52 3.16 3.67 3.44 .376 
1.6.1 Because other Libyan banks manage 
earnings – state 89 3.13 .882 3.10 2.92 3.20 3.32 .367 
1.6.2 Because other Libyan banks manage 
earnings – private 87 3.26 .982 3.41 3.00 3.29 3.36 .499 
1.7.1 To avoid reporting losses - state 91 3.59 1.033 3.40 3.56 3.25 3.96 .109 
1.7.2 To avoid reporting losses – private 88 3.58 1.047 3.55 3.64 3.35 3.71 .885 
1.8.1 To meet predetermined income – state 90 3.39 1.013 3.57 3.19 3.37 3.44 .562 
1.8.2 To meet predetermined income – 
private 88 3.48 .947 3.83 3.29 3.53 3.29 .165 
1.9.1 To decrease tax payment – state 92 3.29 1.022 3.55 3.04 3.29 3.36 .381 
19.2 To decrease tax payment – private 90 3.71 .939 3.64 3.60 3.82 3.81 .868 
1.10.1 To influence assessment by credit rating 
agencies – state 94 3.43 .823 3.48 3.33 3.56 3.39 .706 
1.10.2 To influence assessment by credit rating 
agencies – private 89 3.69 .748 3.76 3.56 3.78 3.68 .745 
1.11.1 To influence stock price – state 93 3.44 1.005 3.48 3.26 3.41 3.61 .678 
1.11.2 To influence stock price – private 89 3.66 .941 3.86 3.28 3.78 3.80 .112 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about earnings 
management motivation in LCBs. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-
W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. A * 
indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
The results reported above in Table 3 (Panel A) show that the stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
earnings management motivations of LCBs are to large extent consistent with earnings 
management motivations reported in the literature; for example Management Compensation 
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Contract Incentives, Regulatory and Political Motivations, and Capital Market Motivations. 
However, in very limited circumstances, some individual groups showed a different perception as 
discussed earlier (Auditors group’s perception in regards to Q 1.6.1, Table 3, Panel A). However, 
with the exception of this case, as reported in Table 3 (Panel A) the overall mean scores are above 
the mid-point of 3.00 which indicate a level of agreement among all stakeholder groups about the 
statements. 
Six MW tests were performed to identify any significant differences between any two pairs. The 
results of these tests are shown in Table 3 (Panel B). 
Table 3: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about Earnings Management Motivations 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement K-W P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
1.1.1 Management compensation – state .610 .424 .409 .785 1.000 .301 .320 
1.1.2 Management compensation – private .606 .843 .262 .709 .219 .601 .506 
1.2.1 Job security – state .774 .899 .682 .475 .584 .363 .680 
1.2.2 Job security – private .756 .936 .546 .387 .598 .402 .821 
1.3.1 To avoid regulatory intervention – state .198 .829 .261 .489 .238 .322 .021* 
1.3.2 To avoid regulatory intervention – private .950 .963 .619 .868 .796 .789 .559 
1.4.1 The desire to report smooth earnings – state .305 .556 .341 .407 .112 .121 .911 
1.4.2 The desire to report smooth earning – private .359 .066 .435 .684 .394 .271 .779 
1.5.1 To influence other stakeholders - state .864 .635 .901 .767 .790 .412 .663 
1.5.2 To influence other stakeholders – private .376 .221 .547 .938 .074 .341 .613 
1.6.1 Because other Libyan banks manage earnings – state .367 .639 .518 .323 .276 .109 .720 
1.6.2 Because other Libyan banks manage earnings – private .499 .208 .944 .998 .281 .200 .948 
1.7.1 To avoid reporting losses - state .109 .593 .878 .049* .452 .120 .034* 
1.7.2 To avoid reporting losses – private .885 .796 .753 .600 .525 .867 .516 
1.8.1 To meet predetermined income – state .562 .202 .552 .750 .429 .332 .834 
1.8.2 To meet predetermined income – private .165 .056 .211 .064 .410 .893 .520 
1.9.1 To decrease tax payment – state .381 .131 .506 .548 .316 .216 .940 
19.2 To decrease tax payment – private .868 .851 .759 .642 .489 .476 .962 
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1.10.1 To influence assessment by credit rating agencies – state .706 .581 .701 .746 .239 .840 .387 
1.10.2 To influence assessment by credit rating agencies – private .745 .351 1.000 .688 .341 .687 .683 
1.11.1 To influence stock price – state .678 .523 .934 .621 .638 .235 .579 
1.11.2 To influence stock price – private .112 .041* .727 .959 .071 .060 .713 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions about 
earnings management motivation in LCBs. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), 
and users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
The MW results reveal four significant differences across the different stakeholder groups. First 
of all, the Preparer and Auditor groups seem to have different views about whether bank managers 
practice earnings management in order to affect the share prices of private banks. Both groups 
agreed, on balance, that private LCBs are motivated to practice earnings management in order to 
influence their share price (Capital Market Motivations). However, a notable difference can be 
observed by looking at the questionnaire responses for each individual group. It is clear that 
Preparers stand on the side of agreement given that only 2 Preparers (out of 21 who responded to 
this statement) selected the disagreement option. On the other hand it is less obvious where 
Auditors are standing. Although 11 Auditors (out 25 who responded to this statement) expressed 
agreement with the statement, 2 of which strongly agreed, six (out of 25) disagreed with the view 
that private LCBs engage in earnings management (see Appendix xx). The reason why the 
Auditors’ attitudes may not be that clear could be that 8 Auditors selected the neutral response. 
The response of the Auditor group, in this study, should also be treated with caution in light of the 
fact that only 13 (out of 27, the total number of Auditors group) are professionally qualified. 
Therefore, some of Auditors (the remaining 14) may lack the expected experience to answer the 
questions. For example, they may not have dealt with this statement, and others, with appropriate 
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‘professional scepticism’ and therefore, their answers may not be consistent with the rest of the 
Auditor sample2.  
The second significant difference relates to the Preparer and User groups regarding whether State 
owned banks manage earnings in order to avoid reporting losses. Again this difference should be 
looked at in light of how the questionnaires were answered by each group individually. Preparers 
showed, on average, a level of agreement with the view that state banks may engage in earnings 
management in order to avoid reporting losses with no a single Preparer expressing a strong level 
of disagreement with this statement. In addition, a relatively large number of Preparers did not 
respond to this statement (7 out of 27) and 6 responded neutrally. This leaves us with only 14 
Preparers who showed, on balance, a clear overall attitude; 5 Preparers disagreed, another 5 agreed, 
and 4 strongly agreed with this statement. As for the Users group, they showed a clear level of 
agreement with this statement with only one response on the strongly disagree side. It should be 
noted that all Users responded to this statement; 17 agreed, 6 strongly agreed, and very few (4) 
selected a neutral response. 
A third significant difference revealed by the MW tests was between the Regulator and User 
groups as to whether state banks engaged in earnings management in order to avoid any regulator 
intervention. The Regulators group answered this statement with a neutral mean score while Users 
were, on average, in agreement with a mean score of 3.68. This significant difference could be, 
partially, due to the ambiguous attitude of Regulators to this issue; as 6 agreed while only 5 
disagreed with the statement, one of which showed strong disagreement. On the other hand, Users’ 
attitudes regarding this statement were clearer in their agreement; the total number of Users who 
                                                 
2 No significant difference was found between professional and non-professional Auditors in regards to this 
statement. 
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agreed to this statement is 20 including 4 who strongly agreed that state LCBs may be engaged in 
earnings management to avoid regulatory interventions. 
Finally, a significant difference exists between the Regulator and User groups in terms of whether 
state banks are motivated to manage earnings in order to avoid report losses. The general view of 
Users in respect of this statement was clearer than the opinion of Regulators. The total number of 
Users who expressed a level of agreement with this statement is 23 of which 6 strongly agreed 
with the notion expressed. On the other hand, only 9 Regulators agreed with the statement (one of 
which strongly agreed) while a relatively significant number (4) of Regulators disagreed to this 
statement 2 of which strongly disagreed. 
There is a wide spread level of agreement amongst stakeholder groups that most of the listed 
motivations are perceived as potentially motivating LCBs to engage in earnings management 
practices. The Auditor who gave this statement a mean score of 2.92 (for Q 1.6.1 Table 3, Panel 
A) apparently did not believe, on average, that a public commercial bank would be inspired by 
other banks’ behaviours to engage in earnings management. Also the Auditors group appeared 
neutral in relation to a similar question relating to private banks (Q 1.6.2 Table 3, Panel A) as their 
mean score was 3.00. 
This general level of agreement could reflect stakeholder groups’ beliefs that such motivations, 
when they exist, represent threats to the accountability relationship of LCBs regardless of whether 
they are public or private, or listed or unlisted. An LCB manager may not be seen to be properly 
accountable when such motivations exist. 
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4.2 Perceptions about Earnings Management Tools 
This section identifies to what extent stakeholders agree regarding the techniques which might be 
used by bank managers to alter reported income. The respondents were asked to indicate their 
agreement or disagreement regarding the effectiveness of some potential earnings management 
techniques. The Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted, at first, to identify any significant differences 
between stakeholders groups. The test results are presented in Table 4 (Panel A). With few 
exceptions, most stakeholders groups’ perceptions showed similar means, and most of them 
indicated their agreement with the potential usage of the earnings management methods listed in 
Table 4 (Panel A). More specifically, reserves (Q 2.1) are accorded the highest mean (3.71) 
suggesting it as potentially the most likely method to be used by bank mangers to change their 
firms’ reported income. It has to be mentioned that the term ‘reserves’ does include, inter alia, the 
Loan Loss Provision (LLP) which was mentioned a lot during the interviews. However, in this 
questionnaire the LLP is separately examined as will be discussed later. 
The lowest mean score was given to foreign currency (Q 2.8) and this was because of different 
views held by the Auditors group regarding this question; apparently auditors, on balance, do not 
agree that foreign currency may be used for earnings management by LCBs as their mean score 
was only 2.88. Another two areas of disagreement were in Q 2.5 and Q 2.9 which both had the 
same overall mean score of 3.33. Concealing losses (Q 2.5) which means that bank managers may 
not register transactions in a timely fashion could have an adverse impact on the reliability of the 
reported income e.g. failing to book a huge amount of expenses in the current period. For this 
question, most stakeholders agreed in aggregate that such a tool could be used for earnings 
management; the exception was the Preparers group that was non-committal since it only gave this 
question a mean score of 3.00. The third area of disagreement was about the manipulation of the 
loan loss provision (LLP) (Q 2.9). In this question, the mean score of the Preparers group, on 
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balance, suggests doubt about whether the LLP could be used for earnings management purposes; 
but all the other stakeholders groups agreed with the view that it could as indicated by the mean 
scores. However, an overview on the questionnaire responses by Preparers (Appendix xx) may be 
informative; the total number of Preparers who answered this question is 25 (out of 27) and the 
total number of those who agreed (11) is greater than those that did not agree (9) while 5 gave  
neutral answers. The reason why the overall mean was below 3.00 is that five of the nine Preparers 
who disagreed strongly disagreed that LLP could be used as an earnings management tool. As the 
previous Chapter mentioned, the LLP is one of the provisions a company usually maintains. It, on 
balance, highlighted by all stakeholder groups (according to the overall mean) to be one of the 
techniques that LCBs’ manager may use since it received the highest mean score of 3.71. 
Table 4: Earnings Management Techniques 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD Group Means K-W P-value PR AD RG US 
2.1 Reserves 99 3.71 .799 3.73 3.73 3.68 3.68 .918 
2.2 Revenue recognition 97 3.61 .758 3.60 3.54 3.61 3.68 .942 
2.3 Disposing of high market value assets 100 3.44 .891 3.42 3.26 3.58 3.54 .536 
2.4 Investments 100 3.68 .803 3.58 3.63 3.84 3.71 .872 
2.5 Concealing losses 98 3.33 1.003 3.00 3.19 3.39 3.71 .060 
2.6 Use of misuse of asset-aside interests 97 3.30 .880 3.04 3.48 3.22 3.39 .395 
2.7 Accounting changes 96 3.34 .938 3.08 3.36 3.33 3.57 .423 
2.8 Foreign currency 97 3.20 .953 3.12 2.88 3.22 3.54 .129 
2.8 Manipulation of the loan loss provision 98 3.33 1.110 2.92 3.37 3.67 3.43 .170 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about earnings 
management tools. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups 
are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates 
significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
LLP is suggested by the accounting literature to be amongst the most likely tools for earnings 
management by a bank. Moreover, it may be the most widely used technique since it represents a 
large accrual figure that bank managers can use for earnings management (Sun and Rath, 2010). 
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The results reported in Table 3 are consistent with the literature in respect of the usage of LLP as 
an earnings management tool. 
The second highest mean score (3.68) was given to Investments (Q 2.7.4). The term “Investments” 
refers to either long term or short term amounts invested in shares. The valuation of these shares 
may increase or decrease at the year-end which requires an accounting treatment that would affect 
the reported income on a Fair Value basis. Based on this result, and given that it received the 
second highest mean score, one might argue that LCBs depend, to a large extent, on ‘investment’ 
to manage their earnings which is inconsistent with both the literature and prior interview findings. 
Although the KW results did not reveal any significant differences in Table 4 (Panel A), to be 
consistent with the analysis order adopted earlier, Mann-Whitney tests were performed for more 
details and discussion. The results of the six MW tests are displayed in Table 4 (Panel B). 
Table 4: Earnings Management Techniques 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement K-W P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.1 Reserves .918 .958 .916 .595 .885 .606 .599 
2.2 Revenue recognition .942 .886 .976 .663 .848 .577 .811 
2.3 Disposing of high market value assets .536 .412 .636 .742 .164 .272 .844 
2.4 Investments .872 .928 .566 .773 .398 .668 .731 
2.5 Concealing losses .060 .539 .195 .013* .491 .055 .207 
2.6 Use of misuse of asset-aside interests .395 .101 .506 .265 .329 .618 .737 
2.7 Accounting changes .423 .509 .531 .113 .904 .307 .381 
2.8 Foreign currency .129 .375 .959 .257 .290 .014* .213 
2.9 Manipulation of the loan loss provision .170 .212 .026* .164 .208 .800 .429 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions about 
earnings management tools. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) 
for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
The test results shown above in Panel B reveal three significant differences among the 
stakeholders.  
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The first significant difference is between the Preparer and Regulator groups as regard to the use 
of LLP as a means of managing LCBs’ earnings. The Preparers’ mean score was only 2.92 (the 
least) which suggests that these stakeholders do not regard this method as a potential way for 
managing earnings in the LCBs. On the other hand, the Regulators group showed a mean score of 
3.67 (the highest) revealing their relatively strong agreement with the view that LLP may be used 
for earnings management by LCBs. In addition, the questionnaire responses by the Regulators 
group (Appendix xx) reveal more details that may clarify this difference in perceptions. The 
responses of Regulators to this statement were, to a large extent, clearly in favour of the potential 
use of the LLP, as 15 Regulators expressed agreement with the statement whereas only 2 expressed 
their disagreement, one of which was strong disagreement. The responses of the Regulators should 
be viewed in the light of the fact that most of them have work experience at the Central Bank of 
Libya and three of them work for the tax authority. Both these experiences may indicate a good 
deal of knowledge regarding the environment in which LCBs work and the way LCBs’ financial 
information is compiled and presented. 
On the other hand, Preparers’ responses were not that clear. As discussed above, 11 Preparers 
agreed that LLP could be used to manage earnings, one of which was strongly agree, while 9 
Preparers disagreed with the statement including 5 who strongly disagreed about the potential use 
of LLP for earnings management by LCBs. 
The second significant difference appeared between the Preparer and User groups regarding the 
use of loss concealment (Q 2.5) by LCBs to affect reported income.  This difference may have 
occurred because of that the Users group has had the highest mean score of 3.71 while the 
Preparers’ gave more neutral responses yielding an exact mean score of 3.00. This apparent 
different can also be explained by looking at the questionnaire responses of individual groups. For 
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example, the questionnaire responses from Preparers (reported in Appendix xx) shows that 10 
Preparers agreed that concealing loss is potentially used to manage LCBs’ earnings. On the other 
side, 8 Preparers disagreed with this view; 2 of them expressed their strong disagreement. 5 Users 
disagreed and 19 agreed including 6 who strongly agreed. 
The last significant difference is that between the Auditors and Users groups regarding the usage 
of exchange rates manage LCBs’ reported income. This was the subject of aggregate disagreement 
by the Auditors group according to their mean score of 2.88 (the least) compared to Users’ mean 
score of 3.54 (the highest). This potential conflict in views can be explained as follows: most 
Auditors are not professionally qualified and thereby may arguably be viewed as lacking the 
required scepticism and/or it may simply be that some of the respondent Auditors do not possess 
a high level of experience, given the fact that 15 (55.6%) of Auditors have less than 5-years of 
banking experience. On the other hand, the Users group consisted mainly of academics that may, 
arguably, be viewed as having less practical experience but look at such issues normatively. 
However, all other stakeholder groups showed, on balance, agreement that ‘foreign currency’ may 
be used by LCBs’ managers to alter reported earnings. 
5. Summary and Discussion 
The motivations which are thought to be behind the exercise of earning management in LCBs are 
the same as those in the literature. Management compensation and job security, regulatory and 
political, and capital market motivations are perceived, on balance, by all stakeholder groups to 
have induced LCBs’ managers to intervene in the process when it comes to determining the 
reported income. This can be achieved, according to the questionnaire results by all listed 
techniques that respondents were asked about. LLP, which the literature suggests is the most 
influential technique of earnings management by banks, is perceived to be used by LCBs’ 
28 
 
managers as well as other techniques. The results also suggest that LCBs’ managers tend to use 
both accounting and real earnings management. 
The evidence provided by the results refer to a serious problem to the accountability. The existence 
of these motivations, although, they may be unavoidable, put pressure on the accountability 
process and expose it to a lack of trust and disrepute which therefore may have an adverse effect 
on the relationship between LCBs’ managers and their stakeholders. LCBs’ manager should be 
free from such motivations in order to produce unbiased and fair accounting information. 
This study is also concerned with how LCBs’ managers could alter the reported earnings. As 
reported in the literature, LLP is quite commonly used by bank managers as a tool for earnings 
management. And apparently this is the case in Libya. The results clearly suggest that stakeholders 
agree, on balance, that LLP is being used by bank managers to alter their earnings, however, other 
techniques have been agreed, on balance, to be used as well. 
Whatever the technique to manage earnings is to be, the main issue is the existence of earnings 
management. This raise concerns about the quality of financial reporting. The questionnaire results 
provide evidence on the existence of earnings management in LCBs’ financial reporting which 
may refer to low quality and breach of accountability.  
The financial reporting that is being provided to LCBs’ stakeholders, based on the results of this 
study, may not be fair i.e. the objectivity of the accounting information is not properly applied. 
Another major finding this study may refer to is that the questionnaire results provide evidence of 
LCBs’ managers actually committing fraud when they thought of themselves as managing 
earnings. Concealing losses, for example, is perceived, on average, to be used by bank managers 
to manage earnings. This evidence may be seen as an explicit evidence that accounting information 
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provided by LCBs’ managers may not be objective and therefore, the entire accounting system of 
LCBs may lack its main function, according to Ijiri (1983), of being, and of being seen to be, fair. 
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